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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
This issue of Studies in the Anthropology of Visual
Communication is devoted to a single study which in many
ways is paradigmatic of the work that this publication and its
parent Society was designed to encourage and to disseminate.
I noted in Volume 1 Number 1 that the Editorial Board was
biased toward actual studies that dealt with visual symbolic
events in their social and cultural contexts. The Editor's
Introduction to that issue of Studies also affirmed our desire
to provide a place where scholars who worked with large
quantities of pictures could present both the conclusions
they drew from the pictures and the pictures themselves.
Studies was never meant to be an illustrated journal in the
style of the National Geographic. We didn't intend to publish
pictures as pretty illustrations for "scientific papers." We did
want to provide a place where pictures, as data, could be
presented alongside words.
The monograph by Erving Goffman which makes up this
issue is to my knowledge the first journal publication
presenting some five hundred photographs as part of an
analysis of social ceremony. The study not only reproduces
the pictures but attempts an extended analysis of how
pictures themselves, and pictures of social situations can be
used in scientific research. Because this is the first time that a
scientific study of social behavior containing so many
pictures has appeared in a single journal article, it might be
important to frame and to situate (in Goffman's sense) this
research within the context of other work analyzing pictures
of all kinds for a variety of purposes.
Within social science the work of Bateson and Mead
(1942), Gesell (1925), and Gesell and Jig (1940) come
immediately to mind. These studies, however, present ·a
different kind of photograph than will be encountered in the
Goffman paper which follows. That is, the earlier studies
were based upon photos taken by the researchers themselves,
in the field, in order to study certain social and biological
events. The photographs they used were not a pictorial
articulation of a society communicating through pictures,
but rather a record of human behavior which these scientists
made, and made available for study. In fact, one of the
important contributions of that work, particularly of
Bateson and Mead, was that not only did the researchers
themselves take the photographs in ways that fit their
research objectives, but they made the photographs and their
analysis of them available to all other researchers. This was
the first time that such a large body of photographs,
produced and analyzed following the systematic rules of
social science, had ever been made available to the entire
scientific community in public-as a publication. It is

important to note, however, that while Bateson and Mead,
and others, were themselves concerned with actually photographing social behavior, the Goffman paper is concerned
with a different issue, a different use of photography, and a
different method of analysis.
In many ways the issues about pictures that concern
Goffman in this mongraph-and it is important to point out
that issues about pictures are not the only ones he deals with
here-revolve around what he calls a "situated social fuss."
He is concerned with social situations, with social ceremony,
with the affirmation of basic social arrangements. He finds
that symbolic events such as weddings, as well as
advertisements picturing a wedding, allow us to understand
the nature and the presentation of ultimate doctrines about
man and the world. It must be noted that not only the
advertisements he analyzes, but the fact that a noted social
scientist analyzes them, can equally be understood as part of
the situated social fuss he is studying.
This kind of study-of social behavior as seen through a
symbolic form - has a long tradition in the history of the arts,
and although shorter, a lively tradition in such fields as
psychoanalysis and social science. The traditions of art
history, and of literary criticism, revolve around systems,
theories, and examples,. of the analysis of individual works
and aggregates of works by individual "artists," '-'schools of
artists," "periods," "genres," "styles," and so on. These
studies, until very recently, were almost all conducted within
a humanistic framework and did not share any of the
paradigms of a positivistic scientific framework. Many of
them, however, whether primarily evaluative, iconographic,
or interpretive in nature can be understood to deal with
persons and their place and behavior in society. On that level
much of the analysis of symbolic events within a humanistic
tradition can be helpful in clarifying what Goffman conceives
as the function of ceremony: "the affirmation of basic social
arrangements and the presentation of ultimate doctrines
about man and the world." These arrangements and these
doctrines as presented by the artist were not always clear or
easy to understand and contextualize. The function of the
iconographer, historian, or critic, in part, was to situate the
work or works in question and to point out precisely what as
well as how they explicated and presented a "picture" of
man at some particular time and place. It was, of course,
· commonly accepted within these traditions that novels,
plays, stories, paintings, and other art forms could be
analyzed to show what, as well as how, people in different
periods, classes, and cultures believed about themselves and
the world they lived in. It was also accepted that although an
individual artist could and did articulate conventionalized
social behavior, postures, and events in his works he did not
have to- nor was it even appropriate to- articulate these
conventions as rules of social behavior as such. Artists
presented society, they were not forced to analyze it as well.
Theories about how to articulate the rules of human and
social behavior, and theories about whether most people
know, or could know most of the rules that governed their
behavior have recently been the center of much interest and
controversy. Whether we can articulate "grammar" even
though we speak "correctly," whether we know or can know
why we "love" even though we are "in love," and whether
we can articulate the rules of weddings, eating in restaurants,
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or greeting our family and friends are problems that today
have become central to our search for an understanding of
our own behavior. What is held in common by the art
historian, the literary critic, the linguist, and increasingly by
other social scientists, is the belief that through the study of
how we articulate in a variety of symbolic modes will come a
fuller understanding of how we structure and situate
ourselves in the world. In the sense that Goffman's paper is
about, the way we present ourselves (and accept ourselves as
presented) in a certain kind of picture-an ad-can tell us
about some of basic social arrangements. In that sense, the
"grammar" of ads may reflect the "grammar" of social
arrangements, and the rules governing how women in ads are
shown in relation to men may tell us how our society
structures the concept of Gender.
In recent years this kind of analysis has often been labeled
content analysis. When Freud (191 0) published his analysis
of one of Leonardo da Vinci's paintings, he felt that he was
merely extending his theories about human behavior to the
behavior of great, as well as, ordinary men. He argues that
the same psychological principles should hold for all men,
and felt compelled to defend himself against the charge that
he was demeaning the great by resorting to the kind of
psychoanalysis applied only to the "sick." Freud, although
he is not often thought of as a social analyst, realized that an
analy~ ! s of what people believed - whether those beliefs were
true or false in a scientific sense- could be used in the
analysis of social as well as personal behavior. In justifying
his use of anecdote in his analysis of da Vinci he wrote, "and
even if this story of Vasari's has neither external nor much
internal probability but belongs to the legend which began to
be woven around the mysterious Master even before his
death, it is still of incontestable value as evidence of what
men believed at the time" (my italics).
Erik Erikson (1950), based on iconographic methods
developed for the analysis of paintings and filtered through a
Freudian framework that argued that evidence of what men
believed could be found in autobiographies of popular heroes
as well as films made about the lives of such men, used the
Soviet film Childhood of Gorky to develop an analysis of
Russian psychological character. Erikson's method has
subsequently been labeled psychohistory rather than content
psychoanalysis and has been employed by an increasing
number of researchers in studies relating personal to large
scale social behavior and events.
By the time of World War II a small group of social
scientists in several countries had realized that an analysis of
symbolic productions such as speeches, books, stories,
movies, and cartoons produced in a particular society and
widely disseminated therein, could be used as evidence of
popular belief. Not only could these symbolic events be used
as evidence of what people believed but they could be used
as evidence of what political leaders wanted people to
believe. Harold Lasswell and a small group of political
scientists set about analyzing the speeches of German
political leaders. In 1945 Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and
a group of their colleagues began work on what became the
first large-scale comparative analysis of the symbolic mass
media productions of other cultures (Mead and Metraux
1953). They called their work cultural analysis.
Later Nathan Leites and Martha Wolfenstein (1950), who
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had worked in the original Culture at a Distance Project,
attempted a large-scale comparative analysis of the most
popular films of England, France, and the United States. In
many ways their work can lead us directly to the kind of
study so differently developed by Goffman.
Wolfenstein and Leites argued that "where a group of
people share a common culture, they are likely to have
certain daydreams in common. We talk, for example, of the
American dream ... and the acquisition of gleaming cars and
iceboxes ... " In that context the authors of the study
discuss the new types of heroes and heroines that appear in
the mass media and whose images come to life. They argue
that their analysis of movies will, for example, allow them to
gain insight into such things as a culture's ideas about "the
ideal girl." " ... numerous young men (will) see how the girl
who fits their half-formulated wishes looks and talks and
how she behaves with her man."
Since the 1940s there have been many analyses of this
kind, seeking to find common patterns of heroes, villians,
family life, violence, and other examples arising out of "the
recurrent daydreams which enter into the consciousness of
millions ... " (Wolfenstein and Leites). Most recently George
Gerbner (1972-76) has developed a concept which he
describes as an analysis of cultural indicators, in which he
analyzes mass media productions ranging from confession
magazines and comic books to prime time television, in an
attempt to describe and to assign social meaning to those
messages that are recurrently being disseminated through the
mass media.
While framing Goffman's work within the tradition of
Freud and of cultural and content analysis it is necessary- as
it is with all frames-to realize that the frame is in Goffman's
terms, "a small scale spatial metaphor ... (a place within
which) mythic historic events are played through in a
condensed and idealized version." In the tradition of Freud
as well as Durkheim, Goffman believes that his analysis of
what is frequently overlooked as a trivial social event serves
to uncover a great deal of social life that is ordinarily hidden
in unformulated courses of activity and experience. Going
further, Goffman in this study is arguing that certain kinds of
social pictures provide us with glimpses of these condensed
and idealized versions of mythic historic events and give the
individual "an opportunity to face directly a representation ... a mock up of what he is supposed to hold dear, a
presentation of the supposed ordering of his existence."
This study can be understood as being in several frames at
the same time. On one level it can be understood as a study
of ceremony, on another as a study of pictures. As a study of
ceremony it is about special ceremonies called advertisements
which tend to describe how society structures itself. As a
study of pictures it is about a special kind of picturing
ceremony which Goffman calls "social portraiture" through
which a society expresses itself. As Goffman sees it, these
social portraits are both the substance and the shadow of
social life. While earlier analysts took for granted the
distincti·on between a picture and that which it depicts,
Goffman tends to show the connection between the two; to
emphasize the complex relationship between everyday
ceremonial behaviors and such symbolic representations of
these behaviors as pictures.
Another frame through which Goffman's analysis of these
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social portraits must be looked at is the frame of the
ethologist. Here Goffman presents two seemingly contradictory frames at the same time. He presents the concepts of
. ceremony and ritual as being primarily social arrangements,
while at the same time presenting the ethologist's concept of
ritual and ritual expression as a form of "species utilitarian
display" that serves to regulate social life from a biologically
determined base. Here the double frame becomes important
since it allows Goffman to distinguish between communication behavior and other forms of social arrangements. He
recognizes that patterns of behavior may tell us certain things
about society-may inform us as witnesses-without communicating.1 As he puts it "Displays don't communicate in
the narrow sense of the term; they don't enunciate
something through a language of symbols openly established
and used solely for that purpose." Goffman's bringing
together of the view that some symbolic behavior is social
with the view that some symbolic or ritual behavior is genetic
or biological forces us to examine the intentional or
meaningful nature of the social forces that he talks about.
In the section entitled "Picture Frames" Goffman then
addresses many of the questions related to the nature of
photographs as expressions, evidence, and truth statements
about social "reality." Here he lays aside questions of the
hidden nature of the material he is dealing with, and is
willing to take the difficult position that the camera both
fakes what is before it and that what is before the camera
doesn't allow one to fake. He thus bravely tackles the core
issues of camera truth and camera structure. The issue then
gets further complicated because he is dealing with concepts
about the structure of social reality (or the pattern he
discerns as social reality) and the very act of structuring
reality by symbolic means.
In dealing with the special kind of picture used in
advertisements as well as something as basic to social
organization as gender, Goffman is forced to face the
difference between certain intentionally created symbolic
fusses meant to communicate- such as photographs in
advertisemen.ts-and social behaviors and arrangements that
may organize or help to -organize social life but are not yet
openly established enough to become conventionalized
communicative symbols. He recognizes that models may be
shown in photographs. in a way that is systematically
different from the way they might deploy themselves when
not before a camera. In explicating this duality-that people
can behave so as to appear in pictures in ways that they never
behave in "real life"-G.offman develops the term
instantiation, or instance record. He sees clearly that a
picture is an instance record of an event before the camera. It
can at best prove that such goings on as are shown can be
performed. An instance record, he points out, is not
necessarily an inst2.nce of social practice in "real life." What
one can understand, however, is that many such advertisements are a body of instance records of another kind of
social practice-a symbolic practice. By showing the nature
of pictures and by examining how certain kinds of pictures
show or portray the world we learn some of the regularities
of the situated social fusses we make about things.
Goffman adds another important concept to our understanding of pictures and the "real world." It is his constant
emphasis on the duality of relationship between what a

picture is and what it is of that helps us to see how the way
we behave is colored by the way we interpret pictures of the
way we behave, and that conversely, the way we make
pictures of behavior is colored by the way we interpret
behavior. In this connection he introduces the concept of
glimpsing.
Here, in a tradition that can be traced back to Harry Stack
Sullivan in psychiatry, Goffman points out that what we see
of people in social situations is only a glimpse of the
outside-the public as opposed to the private self-and that
from thes~ glimpses of a social person we construct a social
reality. The psychological, personal reality most often not
only remains hidden, but often is not needed for our
understanding of the social behavior in question . His example
of the young couple in a jewelry store presenting a "picture"
of young marrieds, or about-to-be marrieds, shopping for a
ring while in fact whiling away some time before going to the
Fellini movie down the block, raises the all important issue
of the "truth" of social reality. For Goffman is implying that
the way we behave when we can be glimpsed depends in large
part on the way we want our social selves to be understood:
that we all know how certain behaviors will be interpreted
and that we all both act and interpret in that way. Goffman's
position is subtle and complex. He is telling us that
advertisers pose their models so that when we see their ads
we interpret them as we would glimpses of social behavior.
That these pictures capitalize on conventionalized portraiture
rules for "maleness," "strength," "wife," "sexy," 'rich," and
so on. At the same time, he implies, we must understand that
advertisers and other people engaged in acts of communication can do so only within the frameworks of social behavior.
That in fact social behavior itself is the act of posing for the
glimpse~ of observers.
There is no doubt of the cogency of Goffman's reflections
about the nature of social behavior and of a picture's
articulation of specific glimpses of that behavior for
communicative purposes by a picture maker. The question
that Goffman then must face is the nature of his own
analysis of these pictures. As laymen, as ordinary social
creatures, we must be satisfied with the socially situated
glimpse. But what about the analyst? Is he glimpsing-taking
a quick look at these pictures and making some off-the-cuff
comments on the society they portray in terms of the same
set of social conventions under which the pictures were also
produced-or is he doing something different; something
deeper, and more "scientific?" Goffman's analysis implies
the question. Future studies may be able to supply some
answers.
In the third section of this study Goffman tackles the
problems facing the social analyst in the analysis of pictures.
He faces questions of sample and sample size, the ability to
generalize from certain groups of data, questions of "truth"
and "realism" in pictures, and some of the central
methodological problems in the social sciences; the problems
of discovery, presentation, and proof. He argues that working
with photographs allows one to exploit the very special
advantages they have in the process of discovery and
presentation of material about social behavior.
This section, in which the pictures he has assembled are
embedded, contains one of the few instances that I have seen
of an open presentation of the pros and cons of an analytic
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method. He discusses how he believes pictures can and can't
be used in social analysis. He outlines a series of arguments
showing why the method he uses is valuable, as well as a
series of arguments detailing why one shouldn't pay much
attention to it. He sums up much of the argument current
today in social science revolving around the study of a
certain kind of photography used as a datum of social
analysis. Much of his argument is, in my opinion, valid for
most other kinds of communicational symbolic events. The
analysis of films, television, novels, plays, comic books, and a
wide variety of mass produced material can also be analyzed
as social portraiture and will, I feel sure, benefit greatly from
this fully documented section dealing with Goffman's own
methodology.
It is finally necessary to clarify two other frames which
are important to Goffman as well as to most analysts of
society. One frame is bounded by what we may define as
"out there," a natural world in which we assume our social
space and activities exist and take place. Another frame is
bounded by our own articulations of that space and
behavior; by what we say, picture, write and otherwise
symbolize in the complex modes, media, and codes in which
we have learned to structure our universe. It is important to
understand that these two frames are not mutally contradictory or exclusive, and that pictures can be employed
for analysis using both frames. In some cases the problem is
to produce pictures which can be used as evidence of certain
events, as instance-events, as evidence that Mr. X was in a
certain place doing certain things, or as a record of the way
we observed certain behaviors with a camera. In other cases
the problem is to examine pictures that have already been
produced for a variety of purposes: by politicians running for
office, by advertisers trying to sell beauty creams, by
"artists" giving us examples of their structures of the world.
Both, in a way, are in Goffman's sense of the term, social
portraits. The differences, I believe, are differences of scale,
of level, of analytic activity attempted. It would be missing
much of the point of Goffman's analysis of how pictures can
be used in social analysis to take this study as an argument
for one picture frame opposed to another.
The point, I think, is not what kind of pictures one
makes, or what kind of pictures one analyses. The point must
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be the kind of analysis one makes. I believe it would be most
fruitful to consider this study as an example of an important
kind of situated social fuss one good analyst can generate
from a specific group of pictures.

Sol Worth
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
August 1976

NOTES
1

For a fuller explanation of a concept of communication which
makes explicit the distinctions between communication and interaction, between informing and attributing and implying and
inferring, see Worth and Gross (1974 ).
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